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COMMENTS
A BETTER TWIN RIVERS: A REVISED APPROACH TO
STATE ACTION BY COMMON-INTEREST
COMMUNITIES
Evelyn C. Lombardo+

Nearly fifty-nine million Americans live in private common-interest
communities, governed by member-elected governing boards or associations.1
Residential associations create rules that influence various aspects of suburban
life, from landscaping and exterior paint colors to the posting of political
signs. 2 Residents generally welcome regulations that community associations
promulgate because such rules create and maintain the atmosphere and

+ J.D. Candidate, May 2009, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A. Fordham University. The author thanks Professor Ben Barros for his suggestion to pursue
this topic, as well as his expertise and guidance, the author's parents for their love and support,
and Shane D'Aprile for his constant encouragement.
1.

See

CMTY. ASS'NS

INST.,

DATA

ON U.S.

COMMUNITY

ASSOCIATIONS,

http://

www.caionline.org/about/facts.cfm (last visited Jan. 21, 2008). The Restatement defines a
common-interest community as
a real-estate development or neighborhood in which individually owned lots or units
are burdened by a servitude that imposes an obligation that cannot be avoided by
nonuse or withdrawal
(a) to pay for the use of, or contribute to the maintenance of, property held or
enjoyed in common by the individual owners, or
(b) to pay dues or assessments to an association that provides services or facilities to
the common property or to the individually owned property, or that enforces other
servitudes burdening the property in the development or neighborhood.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.2 (2000).

2. See Wayne S. Hyatt & Jo Anne P. Stubblefield, The Identity Crisis of Community
Associations: In Search of the AppropriateAnalogy, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 589, 611-12
(1993) (noting that associations typically restrict the exterior aesthetics of private property that
otherwise "might result in unreasonable annoyances to persons beyond the boundaries of the
private property"); see also Paula A. Franzese, Privatization and Its Discontents: Commoninterest Communities and the Rise of Government for "the Nice", 37 URB. LAW. 335, 336-37
(2005) ("Covenants have been devised to regulate everything from whether pets are permitted,
what the maximum weight of an allowed pet must be, the permissibility and, if permitted, the
design of one's doghouse and birdhouse, the precise contours of landscaping content and style,
the architectural style of one's home, the color of one's home, the color of one's shutters, the
color of one's interior drapes, the permissibility of screen doors, the posting of signs, and even the
propriety of wok-cooking." (footnotes omitted)).
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lifestyle 3 that attracted the residents in the first place. 4 In some instances,

however, common-interest community residents encounter regulations that
restrict political speech,5 and appear to suspend certain constitutional rights
within these otherwise idyllic, often gated, communities. 6 This situation gives
whether common-interest communities may be
rise to the current legal debate:
7
classified as state actors.
Some commentators argue that common-interest communities and their
member-elected boards are essentially state or public actors by virtue of their
3. See generally David L. Callies, Paula A. Franzese & Heidi Kai Guth, Ramapo Looking
Forward: Gated Communities, Covenants, and Concerns, 35 URB. LAW. 177, 183 (2003)

(asserting that "gated communities in the United States fall into one of three categories: so called
'lifestyle communities, prestige communities, and security zone communities"' (quoting
EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED COMMUNITIES IN

THE UNITED STATES 1-3 (1997))).
4. Cf Laura T. Rahe, Comment, The Right to Exclude: Preserving the Autonomy of the

Homeowners' Association, 34 URB. LAW. 521, 524 (2002) ("[D]evelopers establish a
homeowners' association's restrictive covenants bearing in mind that the covenants will affect the
desirability, and hence the value of the property."). Because association regulations are typically
benign, courts generally employ non-constitutional standards of review, including the business
judgment rule and the reasonableness test. Ronald L. Perl, Legal Standardsby Which Community
Association Boards are Judged, N.J. LAW. Oct. 2006, at 41-44. These standards examine
whether the regulation is authorized by the community's governing documents and whether the
regulation is unconscionable or unreasonable. Id. at 43.
5. See Lisa J. Chadderdon, No PoliticalSpeech Allowed: Common-Interest Developments,
Homeowners Associations, and Restrictions on Free Speech, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 233,

234 (2006) ("Such bars can, and often do, include a prohibition on all campaign signs, political
banners and fliers, and even on displaying the American flag.").
6. See Adrienne Iwamoto Suarez, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions . . . On Free
Speech? FirstAmendment Rights in Common-Interest Communities, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.

J. 739, 741 (2006).
7. See, e.g., Lara Womack & Douglas Timmons, Homeowner Associations: Are They
Private Governments?, 29 REAL EST. L.J. 322, 329 (2001) (describing the lawsuit filed on behalf

of homeowners against a homeowners' association, in which the homeowners alleged that the
association is akin to a state actor). As a general rule, the federal Constitution's Bill of Rights
does not protect individuals from conduct by private organizations or actors. Id. ("In the absence
of statutes, the Constitution's individual rights provisions usually do not protect people from the
acts of private parties."). Because the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only state action, any
infringement upon federal constitutional rights by a private actor is per se outside the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Suarez, supra note 6, at 744. Despite the per se rule, when private
organizations engage in governmental activity, courts may assume state action, applying
constitutional principles to private entities. See David J. Kennedy, Residential Associations as
State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761,

778 (1995) (discussing use of the state action doctrine to remedy violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment when "ostensibly private conduct takes on a public character"). Moreover, courts
engage in case-specific factual analysis when determining whether particular challenged activity
represents a private or a state action. Cf Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972)
("IT]he question of whether particular discriminatory conduct is private, on the one hand, or
amounts to 'state action,' on the other hand, frequently admits of no easy answer 'only by sifting
and weighing circumstances can the non-obvious involvement of the state in private conduct be
attributed its true significance."').
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regulatory and assessment capacities. 8
Others argue that community
associations are essentially private organizations, in which members simply
purchase individual lots or units burdened by servitudes. 9 The foregoing
public-versus-private distinction is significant because the Fourteenth
Amendment (which makes most of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states)
prohibits only state action.' 0 In particular, this Comment examines the New
Jersey courts' struggle to develop an appropriate analogy to characterize
community associations. About one million New Jersey residents live in
private communities. 11 As a result, New Jersey courts have served as a hotbed
of litigation among discontented residents and their governing boards.12
8. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 7, at 778 ("[F]unctions served by associations and their
interdependent relationships with local governments transform their basic nature from private to
public, such that they should be regarded as state actors."); Womack & Timmons, supra note 7, at
327 ("The private communities have become a vehicle for shifting responsibility, financial and
otherwise, away from municipalities. Some municipalities have seen this as an opportunity to
shed the financial pressures associated with infrastructure costs and providing community
services, and have encouraged the development of such communities. By doing so, the
municipalities are abdicating to the homeowner associations the authority to act in ways that
potentially intrude upon individual rights."). Commentators suggest that community associations
exercise a variety of quasi-municipal powers. See Womack & Timmons, supranote 7, at 330; see
also Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 2, at 601. For example, a common-interest community's
board may regulate the use and enjoyment of community common areas, as well as individually
owned property. See Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 2, at 609-10. Associations often set and
collect assessments, regulate land use and aesthetics, enforce use restrictions, and conduct
periodic elections. Id. at 611-15. Many residential associations also provide services, including
individual and common services. Id. at 618-19.
9. See, e.g., Rahe, supra note 4, at 521 (arguing that for members to realize the benefits of
restricted communities, courts must uphold the private nature of homeowners' associations).
Servitudes or covenants obligate the owner to pay assessments associated with maintenance of
common property and other facilities, or to support the activities of an association. See WAYNE
S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUMS AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS: A GUIDE TO THE DEVELOPMENT

PROCESS 7-8 (3d ed. 2000); see also Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 2, at 612-13. In addition,
most common-interest communities require automatic mandatory enrollment in an association of
property owners upon purchase. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.2 cmt. a
(2000). Other authors argue that community associations are essentially private in nature because
members voluntarily agree, via contract, to pay fees and abide by association regulations. See,
e.g., Rahe, supra note 4, at 522 (noting the contractual and private nature of homeowners'
associations).
10. See Womack & Timmons, supra note 7, at 329; see also supra note 7.
11. See Associated Press, N.J High Court: Homeowners Must Abide By Association Rules,
FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, July 27, 2007, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspxid=
18850.
12. See, e.g., Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 929
A.2d 1060, 1063 (N.J. 2007). In 1995, the New Jersey General Assembly appointed the
Task Force to Study Homeowners' Associations.
ASSEMBLY TASK FORCE TO STUDY
HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS 1 (1998), availableat http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/
reports/homeown.pdf. The Task Force held several public hearings throughout the state and was
charged with "mak[ing] recommendations concerning the functions and powers of homeowners
associations." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, legislation to reform state
regulation of homeowners' associations is pending before the New Jersey State Senate and
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In Twin Rivers, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed a controversial
decision by the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court, which
recognized Twin Rivers' Homeowners' Association as a "public sector
actor[]."' 13 The New Jersey court was the first state appellate court in the
country to apply state constitutional provisions to a private common-interest
community. 14 The superior court reasoned that the association's regulations
governing the posting of political signs, prohibiting access to the community
newsletter, and regulating assembly in the community room could potentially
violate the state constitution's guarantee of free expression, and remanded the
case for reconsideration in light of this standard. 5 The New Jersey Supreme
Court later reversed, reasoning that Twin Rivers Homeowners' Association
was essentially private, and further, that the regulations
at issue were
16
reasonable with respect to time, place, and manner.
This Comment will argue that, although the New Jersey Supreme Court
properly characterized Twin Rivers' Homeowners' Association as a private
actor, the court embraced an inappropriate public-forum standard in reaching
its conclusion. First, this Comment will examine the development of the
public-forum model and its ultimate rejection by the United States Supreme
Court. It will discuss the public-forum approach adopted by a minority of
states, including New Jersey. Part I will also examine approaches to the state
action problem used by a majority of jurisdictions. Next, this Comment will
address why various approaches to the state action issue are inadequate when
evaluating common-interest communities. Then, this Comment explores a
revised functional framework that would subject community associations to
narrowly tailored constitutional liability. This pragmatic approach presents a
much-needed solution to a growing problem, as more people choose to live in

General Assembly. See Common Interest Community and Homeowners' Association Act, S.
308, 213th Leg., 1st Annual Sess. (N.J. 2008); New Jersey Uniform Common Interest Ownership
Act, A. 1991, 213th Leg., 1st Annual Sess. (N.J. 2008).
13. See Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 890 A.2d
947, 954 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), rev'd, 929 A.2d 1060 (N.J. 2007). The superior court
rejected the term "quasi municipal" and instead considered whether the activities at issue "are
essentially in performance of public functions or impact with sufficient directness upon public
interests to call into play the constitutional limitations that classically apply to public sector

actors." Id.at 954-55.
14. See American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, ACLU-NJ Lauds Landmark Free
Speech Decision Regarding Homeowner Associations (Feb. 7, 2006), http://www.aclu-nj.org/
pressroom/aclunjlaudslandmarkfreespe.html ("'For the first time anywhere in the United States,
an appellate court has ruled that such private communities are "constitutional actors" and must
therefore respect their members' freedom of speech, explained Rutgers Law Professor Frank
Askin, lead counsel in the case. 'The court recognized that just like shopping malls are the new
public square, these associations have become and act, for all practical purposes, like municipal
entities unto themselves,' he added.").
15. Twin Rivers, 890 A.2d at 959, 971.
16. See Twin Rivers, 929 A.2d at 1074.
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Further, this approach offers a

middle ground between the public-versus-private dichotomy by recognizing
community associations as public actors for limited purposes. Finally, this
Comment concludes that a revised functional framework preserves the state
action concept while safeguarding association residents against potential
constitutional infringements.
I. THEORIES OF STATE ACTION: HOLDING PRIVATE ENTITIES TO
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS

Plaintiffs seeking to launch a federal constitutional challenge against a
private individual or organization must allege state action:' they must
demonstrate that the activities of the private individual or organization are
governmental or serve a public function.' 9 In the context of community

association litigation, dissident residents seeking to challenge association
regulations on the basis of the federal Constitution must demonstrate that the
activities of their homeowners' association are governmental in nature. 20 A

17. See CMTY. Ass'NS INST., supra note 1. Developing a clear compromise is essential
because more and more Americans are choosing to live in various private communities as
evidenced by the following statistics:
Year
Communities
Housing
Residents
Units
1970
10,000
701,000
2.1
million
1980

36,000

1990

130,000

2000

222,500

2002

240,000

2004

260,000

2005

274,000

2006

286,000

2007

295,700

3.6
million
11.6
million
17.8
million
19.2
million
20.8
million
22.2
million
23.1
million
23.8
million

9.6
million
29.6
million
45.2
million
48.0
million
51.8
million
54.6
million
57.0
million
58.8
million

Id.
18. See Suarez, supra note 6, at 744 (asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment, which
incorporates most of the Bill of Rights including the First Amendment, prohibits only state
action).
19. Id.; see also supra note 7.
20. See supra note 7; Suarez, supra note 6, at 744. When a party attempts to prove that
community associations are state actors, competing interests are implicated. On one hand,
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few states have embraced a lower threshold, asserting that their state
constitutions do not expressly require state action as a basis for imposing
constitutional liability. Those state courts make an exception and apply state
22
constitutional provisions to private property that serves as a public forum.
This Comment refers to the model above as the public-forum approach.
Although the United States Supreme Court briefly ventured into public-forum
jurisprudence, the Court ultimately corrected course. 23 A few states, including
New Jersey, however, continue to follow this public-forum approach. 24
A. From Marsh to Hudgens: The Surge andDecline of the Public Forum

In a landmark decision, Marsh v. Alabama, decided in 1946, the United
States Supreme Court opened the door to the recognition of private
organizations as state actors. 25 In Marsh, the Court considered whether
Chickasaw, a suburban Alabama town owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding
Company (a private corporation), could prohibit a Jehovah's Witness from
distributing religious literature while on company property.26 In holding that
the company owners could not deprive residents or visitors of the freedoms of
press and religion, the Court highlighted Chickasaw's thriving shopping

residential associations seek to operate without interference from the State. See, e.g., Hyatt &
Stubblefield, supra note 2, at 589 ("The entity charged with enforcing these standards, the
community association, provides the vehicle by which the home owners within the community
govern themselves .... "). On the other hand, property-owner members may perceive particular
regulations as infringing on their basic freedoms. See Suarez, supra note 6, at 740-41 (noting the
curtailment of First Amendment rights within common-interest communities).
21. See, e.g., N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757,
775 (N.J. 1994) (finding a right based in the New Jersey Constitution to "leaflet" in a private
shopping mall); Schmid v. State, 423 A.2d 615, 628 (N.J. 1980) ("[T]he rights of speech and
assembly guaranteed by the state constitution are protectable not only against governmental or
public bodies, but under some circumstances against private persons as well."); see also infra
note 57 (citing New Jersey, California, Massachusetts, and Washington as other minority
jurisdictions).
22. See J.MB. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d at 771; see also Schmid, 423 A.2d at 627-28.
23. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 517-19 (1975) (discussing its foray into, and
departure from, the public-forum approach).
24. See J.MB. Realty Corp, 650 A.2d at 775; Schmid, 423 A.2d at 628.
25. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
26. Id. at 502-03. A Jehovah's Witness sought to distribute religious literature in
Chickasaw's shopping district. Id. at 503. In the storefronts, the corporation had posted a notice
which read: "This Is Private Property, and Without Written Permission, No Street, or House
Vendor, Agent or Solicitation of Any Kind Will Be Permitted." Id. Appellant was warned she
could not distribute such literature without a permit, and when she was asked to leave the
sidewalk, she declined. Id. The deputy sheriff then arrested the woman and charged her with
violating an Alabama statute that made it a crime to "enter or remain on the premises of another
after having been warned not to do so." Id at 503-04.
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district and
reasoned that the mining town resembled a municipality in all
27
manners:

The property consists of residential buildings, streets, a system of
sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a "business block" on which
business places are situated. A deputy of the Mobile County Sheriff,
paid by the company, serves as the town's policeman. Merchants
and service establishments have rented the stores and business places
on the business block and the United States uses one of the places as
a post office from which six carriers deliver mail to the people of

Chickasaw and the adjacent area. 28

Because Chickasaw displayed the characteristics of a typical town square, and

because the Gulf Shipbuilding Company profited from public access to its
company property, the Court extended First Amendment
safeguards to visitors
29
and inhabitants of the company-owned town.

The Court emphasized that "[t]he more an owner, for his advantage, opens
up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become30
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."
In Marsh, members of the public frequented store fronts that proprietors rented
from the Gulf Shipbuilding Company.31 One plausible interpretation of Marsh
is that when private property owners procure financial advantage from public
32

use, courts may find state action based on a public-forum rationale.
However, a second, and better, understanding of the decision lies in the Court's
description of Chickasaw. The Court emphasized that the company-owned
town functioned as a traditional municipality. 33 Further, the Court recognized
the corporation as a state actor based on a public-function
analysis, because the
34
corporation essentially stepped into the state's shoes.
In Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
the Supreme Court extended the holding of Marsh to privately owned shopping
centers. 35 Members of the Amalgamated Food Employees Union picketed

27. Id. at 502-03.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 508-09.
30. Id. at 506.
31. Id. at 503.
32. See id. at 508.
33. Id. at 502-04. ("Had the title to Chickasaw belonged not to a private but to a municipal
corporation and had appellant been arrested for violating a municipal ordinance rather than a
ruling by those appointed by the corporation to manage a company town it would have been clear
that appellant's conviction must be reversed."). The Gulf Shipbuilding Company even performed
official policing activities by hiring a local sheriff to keep the peace in Chickasaw. Id. at 502.
34. Id. at 508-09. Courts cite Marsh when conducting public-forum and public-function
analyses. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391
U.S. 308, 319 (1968); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
35. Amalgamated FoodEmployees, 391 U.S. at 319.
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outside Weis Markets, which employed only non-union members.3 6 Weis
Markets was located in a large shopping center complex known as the Logan
Valley Mall, and mall proprietors prohibited trespassing or soliciting by
anyone other than its employees or shoppers. 37 Holding that Weis could not
prohibit peaceful pickets by union members, the Court reasoned that the
shopping center was analogous to the business block in Marsh.38 The Court
noted that the company-owned shopping district in Marsh and the Logan
Valley shopping center served as commercial and retail centers open to the
public. 39 The Court emphasized that members of the public enjoyed
"unrestricted11 access to the mall property," 40 suggesting that public access
transformed the shopping center into a constitutionally protected public
forum. 4 1 While relying on the public-forum approach first announced in
Marsh, the Court notably failed to demonstrate how the privately owned

42
shopping center stepped into the state's shoes and became a state actor. The
Court did not suggest that the shopping center in the case assumed significant
governmental functions, but merely reasoned4 3 that shopping centers
increasingly resemble a type of town square forum.
In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, Vietnam War protestors sought to distribute
handbills in the interior walkways of a privately owned shopping mall, despite
a mall prohibition against distributing literature. 44 The Supreme Court
distinguished this case from Marsh and Logan Valley, reasoning that the
handbilling in the present case was "unrelated to the shopping center's

36. Id. at 311. "A few days after it opened for business, Weis posted a sign on the exterior
of its building prohibiting trespassing or soliciting by anyone other than its employees on its
porch or parking lot." Id. About a week later, members of the Amalgamated Food Employees
Union began picketing Weis, claiming that the market was non-union and that its employees were
not receiving union wages or other union benefits. Id. The picketing lasted for ten days and
caused some congestion in the parcel pick-up area and parking lot. Id.
37. Id.at3O-ll.
38. Id. at 317 ("The similarities between the business block in Marsh and the shopping
center in the present case are striking."). The Court highlighted the approximately one mile
radius that the mall covered, as well as the composition of roads and sidewalks providing
immediate access to members of the public. Id. at 317-18 ("The general public has unrestricted
access to the mall property. The shopping center here is clearly the functional equivalent of the
business district of Chickasaw involved in Marsh.").
39. Id. at319-20.
40. Id. at318.
41. Id. But see id. at 338 (White, J., dissenting) ("Logan Valley is not a town but only a
collection of stores. In no sense are any parts of the shopping center dedicated to the public for
general purposes or the occupants of the Plaza exercising official powers. The public is invited to
the premises but only in order to do business with those who maintain establishments there.").
42. Id. at 338.
43. See id at 317-19.
44. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 553, 556 (1972).
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operations." 45 While the picketing sanctioned in Logan Valley was directed at
Weis Markets' anti-union policies, the handbilling prohibited in Lloyd
expressed anti-war sentiment, unrelated to any particular retail establishment.46
The Court curtailed the expansive holding of Logan Valley by asserting that, to
be protected, expressive activity must share a rational nexus with the purpose
of the private property at issue.47 The Court reasoned that the Vietnam War
protestors could espouse their message
in alternative locales, such as public
48
streets, and achieve a similar result.
Four years later, in Hudgens v. NLRB, the Court rejected the public-forum
approach altogether, expressly overruling Logan Valley. 49
In Hudgens,
employees of Butler Shoe Company picketed outside of nine retail stores in
Atlanta, one of which was located in the North DeKalb Shopping Center.50
The shopping center was owned by the petitioner, Scott Hudgens. 51 This time,
the Court upheld the mall owner's blanket prohibition against protests. 52 In
doing so, the Court highlighted Justice Powell's majority opinion in Lloyd," in
which he distinguished a shopping center from a company-owned town: "In
effect, the owner of the company town was performing the full spectrum of
municipal powers and stood in the shoes of the State. In the instant case there
54
is no comparable assumption or exercise of municipal functions or power."
The Hudgens Court adopted the Lloyd Court's opinion that the private
shopping center, unlike the Gulf Shipbuilding Company, did not perform
governmental or state functions. 55 Embracing the notion that state action
occurs only when a private entity assumes 56a governmental role, the Court
retreated from its public-forum jurisprudence.
B. The New Jersey Experience: The Shopping Center as Public Forum
New Jersey courts and a minority of other jurisdictions part ways with the
United States Supreme Court when evaluating governmental or state action by
45. Id. at 552. The Court conceded the public nature of the shopping mall and admitted that
"considerable effort [was] made to attract shoppers and prospective shoppers." Id. at 555. The
Court, however, emphasized that the protest by the respondents "had no relation to any purpose
for which the center was built and being used." Id at 564.
46. See id.
at 563-64.
47. Id. The Court distinguished Logan Valley: "The message sought to be conveyed by
respondents was directed to all members of the public, not solely to patrons of Lloyd Center or of
any of its operations." Id.at 564.
48. Id
49. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976).

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.at 509.
Id.
Id.at 520-21.
Id.at 518-19 (quoting Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 567-69).
Id.at 519 (quoting Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 568-69).
Id.at 519-21 (quoting Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 567-69).
Id.(quoting Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 568-69).
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private entities. 57 Those courts recognize that certain private properties, such

as private universities and shopping centers, are public forums and are subject
to state constitutional provisions. 58 In essence, those courts continue to follow
Logan Valley, although the Supreme Court later retreated from that holding.59
New Jersey and other jurisdictions point to the encompassing language of their
state constitutions as the basis for applying constitutional safeguards to certain
private actors.
Under the public-forum approach, courts consider
foremost
61
whether such organizations hold themselves open to the public.
In State v. Schmid, the New Jersey Supreme Court formulated a publicforum model whereby particular private property owners can be treated as
public actors subject to state constitutional free speech provisions. 62 In
Schmid, the court considered whether Princeton University, a private nonprofit
institution, could prohibit a non-student from distributing and selling political
materials on campus. 63 In determining whether First Amendment protections
attached, the court refrained from considering whether Princeton resembled a
company-owned town.64

The court also summarily rejected the Supreme

Court's reasoning in Hudgens, asserting instead that the New Jersey
Constitution, unlike the federal Constitution, does not explicitly require -state

57. See, e.g., N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757,
760 (N.J. 1994); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 628 (N.J. 1980); see also Robins v. Pruneyard
Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 445 N.E.2d
590, 591 (Mass. 1983); Alderwood Assoc. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 108, 110 (Wash.

1981).
58. See, e.g., J.MB. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d at 760; see also Schmid, 423 A.2d at 628.
59. See, e.g., J.MB. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d at 768, 775-76.
60. See, e.g., Schmid, 423 A.2d at 626-27 (noting the broad language contained in the New
Jersey constitution). For example, the New Jersey constitution provides: "Every person may
freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of
that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press."
N.J. Const. art. 1, T 6 (emphasis added); see also Frank Askin, Free Speech, Private Space, and
the Constitution, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 947, 950-51 (1998). Askin argues that the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution and state constitutional provisions regarding free speech are
distinguishable. Id. at 951 ("The First Amendment to the United States Constitution is written in
the negative: 'Congress shall make no laws."' By contrast, Askin notes that most state
constitutional provisions are "written in the affirmative, guaranteeing to individuals the rights of
freedom of expression.").
61. See Schmid, 423 A.2d at 628-29.
62. See id. at 628 (The court reasoned that state constitutional guarantees of free expression
extend directly to governmental actors and are also "available against unreasonably restrictive or
oppressive conduct on the part of private entities that have otherwise assumed a constitutional
obligation not to abridge the individual exercise of such freedoms because of the public use of
their property.").
63. Id. at 616-17. University regulations required off-campus organizations to obtain
permission before distributing materials on campus. University-affiliated organizations and
Princeton students, however, were not required to obtain such permission. Id at 617.
64. Cf id. at 639 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
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action. 65 Instead, the court reasoned that the New Jersey Constitution
furnished a separate basis for protecting individual rights of speech and
assembly. 66 Whereas the federal Constitution prohibits Congress and state
governments from infringing on free speech, the Schmid court stated that New
Jersey's Constitution prohibited not only governmental bodies, but "under
some circumstances ...private persons as well," from curtailing protected
speech.67
In holding that Schmid's activities were indeed protected by the state
constitution, the court considered three factors: "(1) the nature, purposes, and
primary use of such private property, ....(2) the extent and nature of the
public's invitation to use that property, and (3) the purpose of the expressional
activity undertaken upon such property in relation to both the private and
public use of the property." 68 Based on this three-prong test, the court found
that the privately owned universi y campus was a public forum, to which state
constitutional provisions applied. 9 The state constitution precluded Princeton
University, a private institution, from prohibiting students and strangers alike
from disseminating their views on campus.70
Schmid opened the floodgates to numerous state constitutional challenges
against private organizations, and New Jersey courts consistently departed
from United States Supreme Court precedent. This departure subjected
privately owned shopping centers, as well as a private condominium
65. Id.at 624-28. The court noted:
Most recently, this Court recognized through Chief Justice Wilentz that freedom of the
press, intimately associated with individual expressional and associational rights, is
strongly protected under the State Constitution .... The United States Supreme Court
itself has acknowledged that the First Amendment, which implicates this important
freedom, does not accord to it the degree of protection that may be available through
state law.
Id.at 626.
66. Id.at 624-26. The United States Supreme Court recognized that a state constitution's
guarantees of individual rights "may surpass the guarantees of the Federal Constitution." Id. at
628 (citing Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 78-82 (1980)).
67. Id.at 628.
68. Id.at 630 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court reasoned that free expression is
an integral component of fostering student development and promoting scholarship, two key
purposes of the modem university. Id. Evaluating the second factor, the court reasoned that the
university endorsed public participation in academic life by creating an open campus. Id. at 631.
Finally, the court asserted that disseminating political literature was compatible with the
educational goals of the university or the university's use of its property for educational purposes.

Id.
69. Id. at 630-31 ("Princeton University, as a private institution of higher education, clearly
seeks to encourage both a wide and continuous exchange of opinions and ideas and to foster a
policy of openness and freedom with respect to the use of its facilities."). But see id. at 637, 639
(Schreiber, J., concurring) (asserting that for Schmid to succeed under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments "[p]rivate property must possess all the attributes of or be the equivalent of a statecreated municipality before it stands in the shoes of the State").
70. Id. at 632-33.
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association, to state constitutional free speech provisions. 7 1 In New Jersey
Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.MB. Realty Corp., the New

Jersey Supreme Court declared that every regional shopping mall in the state
was a constitutionally protected public forum. 72 The court asserted that the
New Jersey Constitution allowed civic group members to distribute anti-war
leaflets in various regional shopping malls over the objections of mall
owners. 73 Citing Schmid, the court reasoned that private shopping centers have
replaced downtown business districts as forums for public expression: "their
normal use is all-embracing, almost without limit, projecting a community
image, serving as their own communities, encompassing practically all aspects
of a downtown business district, including expressive uses and community
events.

74

The court further held that mall owners subjected themselves to

constitutional liability, typically reserved for governmental actors, by
extending
to members of the public an "all-inclusive" invitation to frequent
75
malls.

Finally, the New Jersey Superior Court applied the reasoning of Schmid to
common-interest communities in Guttenberg Taxpayers & Rentpayers Ass 'n v.
Galaxy Towers Condominium Ass'n. 76 The court considered whether a

condominium association that endorsed particular political candidates and
distributed campaign materials to residents could deny opposing campaigns
access to the private complex. 77 The court recognized the right of nonassociation-endorsed candidates to distribute campaign materials in the
complex, reasoning that because the Galaxy association engaged in significant
political activity at election time, the private property was essentially converted

71. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
72. N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 761
(N.J. 1994).
73. Id. at 760-62.
"Plaintiffs-a coalition of numerous groups--opposed military
intervention [in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf] and sought public support for its views."
Id.at 762 & n.2 (footnote omitted). The Coalition embarked on a "massive leafleting campaign
. . urging the public to contact Congress to persuade Senators and Representatives to vote
against military intervention." Id. at 762. The campaign took place on November 9th and 10th.
Id. The campaign on November 10th targeted large regional shopping centers. Id.
74. Id. at 761.
75. Id. The court emphasized that the leafleting in question-non-commercial speech
unaccompanied by "megaphone, soapbox, speeches, or demonstrations" -was permissible,
subject to reasonable restrictions. Id. In addition, the court noted that a former common channel
of public expression, the downtown business district, "has been severely diminished." Id. The
court opined that the repercussions of prohibiting speech in regional shopping centers "would
block a channel of free speech that could reach hundreds of thousands of people, carrying societal
messages that are at its very core." Id.
76. Guttenberg Taxpayers & Rentpayers Ass'n v. Galaxy Towers Condo. Ass'n, 688 A.2d
156, 156-58 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996).
77. Id. at 156-57.
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"from private to political and thus public use." 78 The court reasoned that the
Galaxy complex was analogous to a public forum, emphasizing that it
contained a mall as well as polling booths for all federal, state, and municipal
elections, and that these facilities were accessible from the public street. 79 By
emphasizing public invitation and access, the Guttenberg court expanded the
scope of public-forum jurisprudence, paving the way for similar challenges
against community associations.80
Only a handful of states have followed in New Jersey's footsteps, subjecting
certain private property to state constitutional provisions by virtue of public
access to that property. 81 California courts have also departed from United
States Supreme Court jurisprudence, reasoning that the expansive language of
the California Constitution's free speech provision applies to governmental
actors and certain private entities alike. 82 The approach that New Jersey and
78. Id. at 158. The court emphasized that the Association was significantly engaged in local
elections because it provided absentee ballot applications to its residents and organized telephone
squads to ensure that Galaxy residents voted. Id. at 157-58. The Association also organized
registration drives, and provided poll workers for onsite polling booths. Id at 157.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 158-59. The court, however, reasoned that the decision was particularly factspecific, emphasizing that the "nature of the private property at issue here is quite different from
the type of property at issue in Schmid or Coalition." Id.
81. See supra note 57; see also Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers
Homeowners' Ass'n, 929 A.2d 1060, 1070 (N.J. 2007) ("[O]nly a handful of states recognize a
constitutional right to engage in [expressive] activity on privately owned property held open to
the public, such as a shopping mall or a college campus.").
82. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 346-47 (Cal. 1979). In Robins, the
California Supreme Court affirmed the rights of high school students to solicit signatures in the
Pruneyard Shopping Center for their petition to the White House. Id.at 342. The court expanded
on Hudgens, reasoning that article I, section 2 of the California Constitution precluded shopping
center owners from prohibiting expressive activity on their premises. Id. at 344. The court
reasoned that the California Constitution afforded "special" protections for free speech: "[t]hough
the framers could have adopted the words of the federal Bill of Rights they chose not to do so."
Id.at 346. Furthermore, "article I, section 2 of the state Constitution reads: 'Every person may
freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press."' Id Because
mall "premises are open to the public during shopping hours," mall owners could not prohibit
members of the public from petitioning shoppers. Id. at 344. The court emphasized the public
nature of the shopping center, highlighting its twenty-one acres, walkways, plazas, and buildings
containing shops, restaurants, and a theatre. Id. at 342.
Despite the holding in Robins however, the California Supreme Court has refused to extend
the reasoning of Robins to a residential apartment complex. See Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden
Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 29 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 2001). There, the court considered "whether a
tenants association has the right to distribute its newsletter in a privately-owned apartment
complex under article I, section 2 . ..of the California Constitution." Id.at 799. The Golden
Gateway court criticized the Robins court for sidestepping the state action question. Id. at 803
("Not surprisingly, the uncertainty surrounding the fate of the state action limitation has spawned
a debate over the wisdom of extending our free speech clause to private actors."). Reasoning that
the owner could indeed prohibit tenants from distributing their newsletters, the court highlighted
the private character of the complex:
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83
California embrace, however, represents the exception rather than the rule,
and only a handful of jurisdictions have followed their lead. By84 contrast, most
jurisdictions follow the Supreme Court's reasoning in Hudgens.

Here, the Complex is privately-owned, and Golden Gateway, the owner, restricts the
public's access to the Complex. In fact, Golden Gateway carefully limits access to
residential tenants and their invitees. Thus, the Complex, unlike the shopping centers
in Robins, is not the functional equivalent of a traditional public forum. Accordingly,
Golden Gateway's actions do not constitute state action for purposes of California's
free speech [provisions], and the Tenants Association has no right to distribute its
newsletter ....
Id. at 810.
83. Two other jurisdictions have followed the New Jersey minority approach. In Batchelder
v. Allied Stores International Inc., the Massachusetts Supreme Court recognized a political

candidate's right to solicit signatures and distribute campaign materials in a private shopping
mall. 445 N.E.2d 590, 591 (Mass. 1983). The court reasoned that candidates could seek
signatures for ballot access, because shopping malls are bustling centers where candidates can
achieve personal contact with voters. See id. at 595. In addition, the court noted that private
shopping centers benefit in terms of sales from broad public access. Cf id. at 595 & n.12.
However, the court carefully limited the protected expressive activity to candidates seeking ballot
access: "We are concerned with ballot access and not with any claim of a right to exercise free
speech rights apart from the question of ballot access." Id. at 595.
Likewise, in Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmental Council, the Supreme Court

of Washington affirmed environmental advocates' right to solicit signatures in a privately owned
shopping center despite the owner's objections. 635 P.2d 108, 110 (Wash. 1981). The court
asserted that advocacy group members enjoyed state constitutional protections to solicit
signatures on mall property, noting the similarity between modem day shopping malls and
downtown business districts. Id. at 117. A divided court adopted the three-prong test announced
in Schmid, for evaluating whether a privately owned space serves as a public forum subject to
state constitutional provisions. Id. at 108, 115-16; see also Schmid v. State, 423 A.2d 615, 630
(N.J. 1980). The court also compared the Washington State Constitution to those of New Jersey
and California, reasoning that the state free speech and initiative provisions do not expressly
require governmental or state action. Alderwood, 635 P.2d at 115-16. Instead, based on the
balancing approach discussed above, the court considered whether private property served as a
public forum. Id. at 116.
Despite the court's holding in Alderwood, the Washington State Supreme Court retreated from
the public-forum approach. See Southcenter Joint Venture v. Nat'l Democratic Policy Comm.,
780 P.2d 1282, 1290 (Wash. 1989). Leaving the holding undisturbed, the court severely
weakened the Alderwood rationale by rejecting a claim by members of a minority political
organization seeking to distribute literature and solicit donations on mall property. Id. at 1283.
The court emphatically asserted: "it is, always has been, and remains basic constitutional doctrine
that both the federal and state bills of rights, of which the right of free speech is a part, were
adopted to protect individualsagainst actions of the state." Id. at 1287. The court reasoned that

the Washington State Constitution prohibits only governmental actors, rather than private
individuals and organizations, from impinging on protected freedoms. Id at 1287-88.
84. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976). Although New Jersey and
California courts rely on the language of their respective state constitutions, other jurisdictions
with similarly worded state constitutions require state action. See Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs.,
469 A.2d 1201, 1207-08 (Conn. 1984). For example, although the Connecticut Constitution
provides, "[e]very citizen may freely speak," the Supreme Court of Connecticut declined, in
Cologne, to apply state constitutional provisions to a regional shopping mall. Id. at 1208-09. In
Cologne, female political advocates sought to enjoin the owners of a large regional shopping mall
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from prohibiting the women's distribution of literature and collection of signatures in support of
the Equal Rights Amendment. Id. at 1202-03. The court, however, ruled in favor of the mall
owners, reasoning that the Connecticut Constitution, like the federal Constitution, only limits the
power of governmental actors. Id. at 1208-09. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that
Article Four of the Connecticut Constitution differed significantly from the First Amendment of
the federal Constitution: "[wie are not persuaded that these variations in phraseology are
sufficient to indicate an intention to allow those rights to be exercised upon every property
affording a suitable opportunity for their enjoyment against the objections of the owners." Id. at
1208-09. Embracing a strict state action requirement, the court asserted that a mere invitation to
the public to use private property does not transform such property into a public forum, on which
state constitutional safeguards must apply. Id. at 1209-10 (citing Lloyd v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551,
569 (1972)). See also Citizens for Ethical Gov't, Inc. v. Gwinnett Place Assocs., 392 S.E.2d 8,
9-10 (Ga. 1980) (rejecting civic group members' claims that malls are the "new town centers,"
and serve as public forums dedicated to public use); Woodland v. Mich. Citizens Lobby, 378
N.W.2d 337, 348 (Mich. 1985) ("[U]nless otherwise expressed, constitutionally guaranteed
protections are applicable only against government.").
New York courts have also repudiated the public-forum approach, and instead apply state
constitutional provisions only to private entities engaged in governmental or state action. For
example, in SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, the New York Court of Appeals considered
whether a private shopping mall could enforce a blanket no-handbilling policy. 488 N.E.2d 1211,
1212 (N.Y. 1985). An advocacy group challenged the prohibition and sought to distribute leaflets
opposing nuclear energy. Id. at 1213. The court ruled in favor of the shopping mall owners
despite the encompassing language of Article 1, section 8, of the New York state constitution. Id
at 1215-16. The New York Constitution provides "[e]very citizen may freely speak, write and
publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no
law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." N.Y. CONST. art.
I, § 8. The SHAD court emphasized that the state constitution's guarantees of free speech were
enacted to protect individuals from encroachments by governmental actors rather than private
entities, reasoning: "[t]hat a Bill of Rights is designed to protect individual rights against the
government is standard constitutional doctrine."
SHAD, 488 N.E.2d at 1215.
While
acknowledging that "the shopping mall has taken on many of the attributes and functions of a
public forum," the court refused to apply state constitutional provisions to private property
owners who invite or encourage public access. Id. at 1217-18. See also Fiesta Mall Venture v.
Mecham Recall Comm., 767 P.2d 719, 723 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (reasoning that because the
shopping centers in question were privately owned, the owners could prohibit political activities
on their premises); State v. Felmet, 273 S.E.2d 708, 712 (N.C. 1981) ("The accosting of
customers in the private parking lot of Hanes Mall to sign a petition, which was a type of
solicitation prohibited by the owners of the property, was not a protected exercise of free speech,"
under either the federal or state constitutions.); W. Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Conn.
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331, 1335-36 (Pa. 1986) (reasoning that the controlling provision
of the Pennsylvania Constitution represents a limitation on the powers of state government, but
not private corporations such as regional shopping centers); Charleston Joint Venture v.
McPherson, 417 S.E.2d 544, 548 (S.C. 1992) (asserting that mall proprietors extend only a
limited invitation to shoppers to engage in commercial activity, rather than expressive activity, on
mall premises); Jacobs v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832, 845 (Wis. 1987) (asserting that even if malls
serve some "public function," their primary goal is to maximize profits, therefore the malls
cannot be said to resemble municipalities).
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C. The Public-ForumApproach Applied to Twin Rivers
Homeowners' Ass'n
1. The Appellate Division Delivers an Anomalous Decision
The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division was the first state court
in the country to apply the free speech provisions of its state constitution to a
private community association. 85 In 2006, the court decided Committee for a
Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, in which a group of
dissident residents sued the Twin Rivers Homeowners' Association
(Association). 86
Residents alleged that various Association regulations
violated the state constitution. 87 The court agreed, citing Schmid and J.MB.
Realty.88 The court emphasized that the expressive rights at issue trumped any
interest in private property. 89 It declined to call the Association a state actor,
but did term it a "constitutional actor." 90 In exercising any dominion over
that the Association was obligated to conform
residents, the court determined
91
to the state constitution.

85. See American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, supra note 14. The press release
noted: "Professor Askin described the case as a national landmark, and said that homeowners
groups across the country have anxiously awaited the outcome, and would now try to convince
other states' courts to emulate New Jersey." Id.; see also David L. Hudson Jr., Private Condo
Groups Subject to Free Speech Rights, 7 ABA J. E-REPORT 1, 2 (2006) (quoting Askin on the
significance of the ruling: "[i]t is a Magna Carta for the million-plus residents of such
communities in New Jersey").
86. Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 890 A.2d 947,
951 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), rev'd, 929 A.2d 1060 (N.J. 2007).
87. Id. The residents filed a nine-count complaint alleging that the association's regulations
governing the posting of political signs, access to the community room, and access to the
community newsletter violated the New Jersey Constitution. Id.
88. Id. at 957-59; see also Frank Askin, Twin Rivers: Why the Appellate Division Got It
Right, 242 N.J. LAW. Oct. 2006, at 11, 14-15 (2006) (recognizing the court's analogy comparing
community associations with shopping malls).
89. Twin Rivers, 890 A.2d at 962 ("[E]ven where there has been no invitation to the public,
our jurisprudence clearly allows access to private property to exercise constitutionally guaranteed
rights. Twin Rivers is in New Jersey. The rights guarantees of our State Constitution apply in
that community as in every other in the State.").
90. Id.at 960.
91. See id The court opined:
The manner and extent to which functions undertaken by community associations have
supplanted the role that only towns or villages once played in our polity mirrors the
manner and extent to which regional shopping centers have become the functional
equivalents of downtown business districts. Common-interest developments are the
fastest growing form of housing in the United States. New Jersey is among the states in
It follows that
which residential community associations are most common.
fundamental rights exercises, including free speech, must be protected as fully as they
always have been, even where modem societal developments have created new
relationships or have changed old ones.
Id.at 960 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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2. The New Jersey Supreme Court Reverses
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the public-forum
approach expounded in Schmid and JM.B. Realty, but reached the opposite
result. 92 Applying the three factors enumerated in Schmid, the court adopted
the Association's argument that state constitutional obligations should not
93
extend to the internal membership rules of private homeowners' associations.
After balancing private property interests against free speech rights, the court
held that the minor restrictions were neither unreasonable nor oppressive. 94 It
refrained from applying state constitutional provisions to the Association
because, unlike universities and shopping centers, common-interest
communities 95
do not expressly or impliedly invite members of the public into
their borders.

92. Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 929 A.2d 1060,
1074 (N.J. 2007); see also Richard G. Jones, Court Upholds Curbs on Signs in New Jersey, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 2007, at B3 (summarizing the court's holding).
93. Twin Rivers, 929 A.2d at 1072-73. First, the court reasoned that the primary purpose
and use of the property was residential. Id. at 1072. Although a few businesses reside within
Twin Rivers' borders, the court emphasized that the Association derives no revenue from such
businesses. Id. Considering the second factor, the nature and extent of public access, the court
reasoned that the Association "has not invited the public to use its property." Id. at 1073. In
rejecting the members' claim that Schmid and Coalition were analogous, the court rejected the
"all inclusiveness" argument that the members presented. See Brief of Appellee at 16-17, Twin
Rivers, 929 A.2d 1060 (N.J. 2007) (No. A-118-122-05), available at http://www.aclunj.org/downloads/TwinRiversBrief.pdf ("[U]nlike visitors to a mall, our plaintiffs do not leave the
property at the end of the day; they and their families live and sleep there."). Instead, the court
emphasized the exclusivity of Twin Rivers: "[t]rust-owned property and facilities are for the
exclusive use of Twin Rivers' residents and their invited guests." Twin Rivers, 929 A.2d at 1073.
The court explicitly rejected any characterization of Twin Rivers as a public forum in which
constitutional safeguards should apply. Id.
Finally, the court considered the third Schmid factor: "the purpose of the expressional activity
in relation to both the private and public use of the property." Id. It characterized the expressive
activity at issue as "political-like speech aimed at affecting the manner in which Twin Rivers is
managed." Id. Nevertheless, the court asserted that the plaintiffs' expressive rights were not
"unreasonably restricted." Id. Instead, the court characterized the Association's regulations
governing the posting of signs, use of the community room, and access to the community
newspaper as reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. Id. at 1074.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 1073. The court noted community members seeking to unseat the current
governing board may resort to alternative means of expression:
Plaintiffs can walk through the neighborhood, ring the doorbells of their neighbors, and
advance their views. As found by the trial court, plaintiffs can distribute their own
newsletter to residents, and have done so. As members of the Association, plaintiffs
can vote, run for office, and participate through the elective process in the decisionmaking of the Association. Thus, plaintiffs may seek to garner a majority to change the
rules and regulations to reduce or eliminate the restrictions they now challenge.
Id. at 1074.
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D. Beyond the Public Forum: Alternate Models of State Action
Courts have advanced three alternative theories of state action when
evaluating constitutional claims against private entities.
These three
approaches--(1) the public-function theory, (2) the state entwinement theory,
and (3) the judicial enforcement theory-offer criteria for characterizing
particular private
actors as state actors so that federal constitutional provisions
96
would apply.
1. The Public-FunctionTheory
The first and most tenable theory for finding state action in the community
association context was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Marsh v. Alabama.97 One rationale for the Marsh holding rested upon the
extent to which the company-owned town resembled other American towns in
all manners. 98 In Evans v. Newton, the United States Supreme Court further
explicated the public-function approach. 99 At issue in that case was whether a
park owned by a private trust could exclude non-white visitors.100 The Court
reasoned that the park could not exclude people on the basis of race under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment' 01 The Court asserted
that the privately owned park was essentially public, emphasizing that parks
are municipal in nature: "[a] park ... is more like a fire department or police
department that traditionally serves the community."' 2 A public-function
theory may support a finding of state action when private organizations are

96. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 291
(2001) (basing its holding on the entwinement theory); Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condo.,
Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1339, 1341 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (discussing the judicial enforcement theory);
Brock v. Watergate Mobile Home Park Ass'n, 502 So. 2d 1380, 1381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(noting the public-function test).
97. See 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946).
98. Id at 507-08.
99. 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
100. Id.at 297-98. In 1911, a former Georgia Senator executed a last will and testament
devising to the mayor and city council of Macon a tract of land that was to be used as "'a park
and pleasure ground' for white people only." Id.at 297. Although the Senator stated in his will
that "he had only the kindest feeling for the Negroes," he was nevertheless of the opinion that
"the two races ... should be forever separate." Id.
101. Id. at302.

102. Id. In particular, the Court noted that the city played an integral role in the park's
maintenance:
From the pleadings we assume it was swept, manicured, watered, patrolled, and
maintained by the city as a public facility for whites only, as well as granted tax
exemption under Ga. Code Ann. § 92-201. The momentum it acquired as a public
facility is certainly not dissipated ipso facto by the appointment of "private" trustees.
So far as this record shows, there has been no change in municipal maintenance and
concern over this facility.
Id.at 301.
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"endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature." ' 0 3
Such an approach considers whether a01private organization or actor assumes
what is essentially a governmental role.
Courts have applied the public-function theory in varying contexts,
recognizing particular private individuals or organizations as state actors. For
example, in West v. Atkins, a prisoner filed a lawsuit against a physician who
contracted with the State of North Carolina to provide orthopedic services at a
state prison hospital. 10 5 The prisoner argued that he received inadequate
medical treatment, which violated his Eighth Amendment right of freedom
from cruel and unusual punishment. 1° The Supreme Court reasoned that a
physician who treats an inmate in a state prison acts under color of state law
within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.107 The Court found that the
physician's conduct was "fairly attributable to the State" because the state has
an obligation under the Eighth Amendment to provide medical services to
prisoners. 108
Courts have also recognized private corporations serving in governmental
capacities as state actors. In Rosborough v. Management & Training Corp.,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered a prisoner's
Eighth Amendment claim against a corrections officer. 10 9 The district court
dismissed the claim sua sponte, "on the ground that [the corrections officer]
was an employee of [a private prison management corporation] rather than an
employee of the State of Texas and, therefore, was not acting under color of
state law."' 10 The appellate court reversed, reasoning that the "confinement of
wrongdoers-though
sometimes
delegated
to
private
entities-is

103. Id. at 299.
104. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
105. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 43-44 (1988).
106. Id.at 45. The petitioner filed a lawsuit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
the physician acted "under color of state law." Id. at 43. The petitioner argued that Dr. Atkins
treated his injury by placing his leg in a series of casts, but refused to schedule surgery, despite
acknowledging that such a procedure was necessary. Id. at 44. The petitioner claimed that Dr.
Atkins discharged him even though his ankle was swollen and painful, and his movement was
still labored. Id.
107. Id.at 54.
108. Id. at 54-55. The Court concluded that because "North Carolina employs physicians,
such as [Dr. Atkins], and defers to their professional judgment" in order to fulfill the state's
obligation to its prisoners, such physicians treat inmates while "clothed with the authority of state
law." Id. at 55; see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (The Court
asserted that "fair attribution" to the State requires first, that the deprivation must be caused by
the exercise of some right created by the State, and "[s]econd, the party charged with the
deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.").
109. Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 459-60 (5th Cir. 2003). The
inmate alleged that the officer slammed a prison door on his fingers, severing two fingertips. Id.
110. Id. at 460.
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fundamentally a governmental function."' 1 1 The court emphasized that prison
operation falls particularly within the state's province. 2
Similarly, some residents claim that community associations serve a public
function because the associations provide for private governance by enacting
regulations and performing neighborhood maintenance. In Bluvias v. Winfield
Mutual Housing Corp., prospective buyers challenged an association
regulation giving existing members priority in purchasing housing units as they
became vacant.' 13 The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the Equal
Protection challenge, reasoning that the community association "does not
exercise the governmental powers of the community." 114 Although the
association owned all of the property within the boundaries of the township,
the court emphasized that it was the municipality who provided traditional
governmental services, including public education.
Because the
municipality provided governance and essential services-not the communit'
association-the community association did not assume the role of the state.,
2. The Entwinement Theory

A second approach, known as the entwinement theory or the "symbiotic
relationship" theory, applies when a governmental body and a private
organization act interdependently, such that they could be viewed as one
entity. 117 In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic

Ass 'n (TSSAA), the United States Supreme Court found a private organization
to be a state actor when it was charged with the oversight of interscholastic
athletics among public and private high schools." 8 The Court focused on
several factors that suggested that TSSAA and the school district were
111.

Id. at461.
112. See id.The court also noted the Supreme Court's suggestion that state prisoners might
file suit under § 1983 against privately owned correctional facilities. Id. at 460; see also
Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71-72 & n.5 (2001). The Fifth Circuit,
relying upon other federal courts, reasoned that the power exercised by the private prison
management company is delegated by the state. Rosborough, 350 F.3d at 461; see also Skelton v.
Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir. 1991) (reasoning that a private company administering
a state corrections facility could be sued under § 1983).
113. Bluvias v. Winfield Mut. Hous. Corp., 556 A.2d 321, 322 (N.J. 1989). "[M]embership

bylaws establish[ed] a priority membership list, [that] favored existing members or their
immediate families for ownership of cooperative housing units as they [became] vacant." Id. at
322.
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 305 (2000)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Monique C.M. Leahy, Homeowners' Association Defense: Free
Speech, 93 AM. JUR. Trials § 12 (2004) ("'[E]ntwinement' with the government will support the
conclusion that an ostensibly private organization ought to be charged with a public character and
judged by constitutional standards.").
118. BrentwoodAcad., 531 U.S. at 290-91.
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intimately connected.' 19 One such factor was that more than eighty percent of
participants were public schools. 120 Moreover, the public schools provided
financial support for TSSAA, and the board held meetings during school
hours. 12 1 Thus, the Court found that because public schools 22and the
association were essentially interdependent, TSSAA was a state actor.'
The entwinement theory and public-function theory appear to be
interrelated. Arguably, the Court may also have properly found that TSSAA
satisfied the public-function test by organizing an interscholastic athletics
program that primarily benefited public schools. 12 3 The Court embraced the
entwinement theory, rather than the public-function theory, as a basis for
imposing constitutional liability, because the24former more precisely describes
the interrelatedness of TSSAA and the state.'
The United States Supreme Court, however, has selectively recognized
private organizations as state actors based upon the entwinement theory. In
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., a consumer sued a privately owned and
operated electric utility company for violating her Fourteenth Amendment
right to procedural due process. 125 The customer claimed that her electrical
service was terminated before she was afforded notice, a hearing, and an
opportunity to pay her overdue bill. 12 6
Although Metropolitan held a
certificate issued by the Pennsylvania Utility Commission authorizing the
utility to deliver electricity to a designated region of the state, the Court
127
that the utility's activities were not fairly attributable to the state.
asserted
The Court also emphasized that although a utility may operate in the "public

119. Id. at 292-93. For example, the Association bylaws provided that each member school
designate a faculty member or principal as a voting representative. Id.at 298.
120. Id.at 298.
121. Id. at 299. In addition, Association members were eligible for state-subsidized
retirement benefits. Id.at 300.
122. Id.at 299-300 ("There would be no recognizable Association, legal or tangible, without
the public school officials, who do not merely control but overwhelmingly perform all but the
purely ministerial acts by which the Association exists and functions in practical terms.").
123. See id.at 302-03. Although the Court assumed, for purposes of its analysis, that the
public-function theory was inapplicable, it did not decide the merits of the claim. Id.at 303. If
the Court had addressed the public-function theory, however, TSSAA is arguably distinguishable
from the school in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (the case cited by the
Association) because, as the Court points out, the public function performed must be "exclusively
and traditionally" public. Id.at 302-03. The Brentwood Court observed that in Rendell-Baker, a
private school offering special-needs education to high school students was not a state actor
because provision of such services was not historically the role of the state. Id. By contrast, in
Brentwood, the Association had been acting in its capacity since 1925, and therefore arguably is
distinguishable from the private special-needs school in Rendell-Baker. Id at 292.
124. Id.at 302-03.
125. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 347-48 (1974).
126. Id.at 347.
127. Id.at 346, 350-51.
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interest," such a standard would immeasurably expand
the scope of private
28
individuals and organizations deemed state actors.1
Similarly, courts have refrained from finding that community associations
are so entwined with the state as to essentially equate association conduct with
state action. In Brock v. Watergate Mobile Home Park, several mobile-home
owners challenged various association regulations as being in violation of their
civil rights.' 9 The homeowners argued that the special statutory status mobile
homes enjoyed "create[d] a nexus between the State and the association that
would make the board's actions equivalent to state action." 3 ° In its decision,
however, the Florida District Court of Appeals considered and rejected that
argument, reasoning that subjection to state law does not foster the level of
interdependence necessary to give rise to state action. 131 This case illustrates
the entwinement theory's limited application.
3. The JudicialEnforcement Theory
A third approach, called the judicial enforcement theory, appears least useful
for finding state action in the context of community association activity. In
Shelley v. Kraemer, the United States Supreme Court refused to enforce a
racially restrictive covenant, holding that judicial enforcement of the covenant
would amount to state action and violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 32 The
Court reasoned that
these are cases in which the States have made available to such
individuals the full coercive power of government to deny to
petitioners, on the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of
property rights in premises which petitioners are willing and
financially able to acquire and which the grantors are willing to
sell.133

128. Id. at 353. The Court asserted that:
Doctors, optometrists, lawyers, Metropolitan, and Nebbia's upstate New York grocery
selling a quart of milk are all in regulated businesses, providing arguably essential
goods and services, "affected with a public interest." We do not believe that such a
status converts their every action, absent more, into that of the State.
Id. at 354.
129. Brock v. Watergate Mobile Home Park Ass'n, 502 So. 2d 1380, 1381 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App.

1987).
130. Id
131. Id. at 1382.
132. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); see also Suarez, supra note 6, at 756-57. The
case arose when an African American family sought to purchase property from a willing seller.
Shelley, 334 U.S. at 5. The land, however, was burdened by a servitude prohibiting occupation
"by any person not of the Caucasian race." Id.
133. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19.
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The Court emphasized that voluntary adherence to the restrictive covenant
would not have implicated the Fourteenth Amendment. 134 However, because
the petitioners resorted to the judiciary to force compliance, the lower court,

acting as an agent
of the state, could not act without violating the Equal
135
Protection clause.

Few courts have extended the reasoning in Shelley as a basis for
constitutional scrutiny of private covenants in common-interest
communities.

For example, in Gerber v. Longboat Harbour North

Condominium, Inc., the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida employed Shelley as a basis for invalidating a condominium
association regulation that prohibited the display of the American flag, except
on designated holidays. 137 However, the majority of courts faced with this
question have discussed and dismissed the judicial enforcement approach when
considering private land use restrictions. 38

134. Id. ("It is clear that but for the active intervention of the state courts, supported by the
full panoply of state power, petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties in question
without restraint.").
135. Id. at 19-20.
136. See Suarez, supra note 6, at 757; see also Hyatt & Stubblefield, supranote 2, at 659.
137. See Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condo., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1339, 1341 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (The court asserted that the principle enunciated in Shelley supports the finding that
"judicial enforcement of private agreements contained in a declaration of condominium
constitutes state action and brings the heretofore private conduct within the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment, through which the First Amendment guarantee of free speech is made
applicable to the states."); see also Goldberg v. 400 E. Ohio Condo. Ass'n, 12 F. Supp. 2d 820,
822 (N.D. I11.1998) ("[O]ld-fashioned patriotism, rather than old-fashioned legal reasoning, is the
source of the Gerber opinion's persuasive force. The plaintiff, we are told, was an Air Force
veteran who wished to 'express[] his deep love and respect for America."').
138. See Goldberg, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 823 ("[T]here is no state action inherent in the possible
future state court enforcement of a private property agreement."); see also Loren v. Sasser, No.
8:99-2413-T-17B, 2000 WL 641602, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2000) ("[T]he mere possibility of
judicially enforced private covenants does not satisfy the 'state action' requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment."), aff'd, 309 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2002); Quail Creek Prop. Owners
Ass'n v. Hunter, 538 So. 2d 1288, 1289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) ("[N]either the recording of the
protective covenant in the public records, nor the possible enforcement of the covenant in the
courts of the state, constitutes sufficient 'state action' to render the parties' purely private
contracts relating to the ownership of real property unconstitutional."); Linn Valley Lakes Prop.
Owners Ass'n v. Brockway, 824 P.2d 948, 951 (Kan. 1992) ("The case before us is easily
distinguished [from Shelley]. The covenant in question places a limitation on the use of the
property by the landowners. There is nothing constitutionally impermissible per se in a private
agreement restricting signs in a residential neighborhood, and enforcement thereof does not
constitute improper state action."); see also Midlake on Big Boulder Lake Condo. Ass'n v.
Cappuccio, 673 A.2d 340, 342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (determining that Shelley is not applicable to
the enforcement of a restrictive covenant absent racial discrimination in a contract between
private parties).
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II. TOWARD AN APPROPRIATE MODEL: WHY EXISTING THEORIES OF STATE
ACTION ARE INADEQUATE IN THE CONTEXT OF COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS

A. The Public-ForumApproach Revisited

In Twin Rivers, both the Appellate Division and the New Jersey Supreme
Court applied the factors developed in Schmid and J.MB. Realty, emphasizing
notions of public access and invitation. 39 A public-forum framework proves
unworkable in this context, however, because common-interest communities
exclude the public by their very nature.' 40 Although universities and shopping
malls may
deserve public status because those spaces encourage public
141
access, community associations foster privacy and shut out members of the
public. 42 Moreover, the ability to exclude others from privately owned
property represents a fundamental property right. 43 Common-interest
communities often foster exclusivity and discourage public access by erecting
physical gates or barriers. 44 Such structural elements signal that only property
owners and their invited guests are welcome.' 45 Thus, an approach
emphasizing public invitation appears incongruous with the very essence of
common-interest communities.
Residence in common-interest communities also offers retreat from the
public sphere. Property owners living in common-interest communities are
bound to promote certain common goals. 46 Some homeowners cite
heightened safety and security as a reason for residing in a private

139. See supra Part I.C.
140. See Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 929 A.2d
1060, 1073 (N.J. 2007).
141. See, e.g., Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 595 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1972); Batchelder
v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590, 591, 595 (Mass. 1983); N.J. Coal. Against War in the
Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 761, 771 (N.J. 1994); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d
615, 622, 630-31 (N.J. 1980); Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 108, 116-17
(Wash. 1981).
142. See Josh Mulligan, Finding a Forum in the Simulated City: Mega Malls, Gated Towns,
and the Promise of Pruneyard, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 533, 534 (2004) (referring to
common-interest communities as privately owned "simulated spaces," in which owners "regulate
behavior within by exerting the most fundamental property right-the right to exclude.").
143. See id.; see also Rahe, supra note 4, at 549 (characterizing the dissolution of the right to
exclude as a taking).
144. See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 765.
145. See id. at 764-65 (noting that a concern for safety has prompted most associations to
construct gates or even moats).
146. See Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 2, at 598-99 (The authors assert that a commoninterest community is "one in which the property owners are tied together with a strong commoninterest. The interest may be in property owned by the community association of which the
owners are all members, or in property owned by the members themselves. In either case, the
organization maintains and controls the property, and it embodies the sharing of interest and
cohesiveness that comes not only from a legal structure but also from that sharing.").
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community. 147 Community associations often expend considerable resources
on security patrols and technology. 148 Prospective buyers may also prefer
common-interest communities to ensure and enhance the value of their
investment. 149 Because buyers seek out private communities promoting
particular values as an alternative to traditional municipalities, such
communities defy comparison to a public forum.
B. The Public-FunctionTheory and Common-Interest Communities
Several commentators argue that common-interest communities are
essentially public. 150 Those authors argue that "the functions served by
associations and their interdependent relationships with local governments
transform their basic nature from private to public, such that they should be
regarded as state actors.' 15 1 The public-function theory, articulated in Marsh
and Evans, supports a finding of state action when a private entity undertakes
governmental responsibilities traditionally performed by the state.1 52 In
Marsh, Chickasaw resembled other American towns, and in all respects this
weighed on the Court's reasoning. 53
Similarly, in Evans the Court
emphasized that operating a community park is particularly a governmental

147. See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 765.
148. See id at 766; see also David Dillon, Fortress America, PLANNING, June 1994, at 8
(noting an example that "St. Andrews, a gated community in Boca Raton, Florida, spends over $1
million a year on helicopters and canine patrols").
149. See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 766 ("Concern for property values ... explains much of
the popularity of residential associations ....).
150. See, e.g., id.at 782-83 (arguing that "residential associations should be treated as state
actors" where there is a strong link between an association and the state, and the association has a
significant effect on the community); Evan McKenzie, Reinventing Common-Interest
Developments: Reflections on a Policy Role for the Judiciary, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 397,
404-05 (1998) (discussing the strong tendency to label a common-interest community a public
actor when the common-interest community "impacts the lives of many people"); Mulligan,
supra note 142, at 534-35 (explaining that the same rationale that courts have used to permit
certain speech rights in shopping centers can be extended to "other forms of privately-owned
public spaces").
151. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 778.
152. See Mulligan, supra note 142, at 542-43.
153. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 503 (1946) ("[Tlhere is nothing to distinguish [this
privately owned town] from any other town and business center except the fact that the title to the
property belongs to a private corporation."). But see Paula A. Franzese & Steven Siegel, The
Twin Rivers Case: Of Homeowners Associations, Free Speech Rights and Privatized MiniGovernments, 5 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 729, 749 n.69 (2008) (asserting that because the
Twin Rivers community contains "a variety of retail businesses," it likely qualifies as a state actor
under "the Marsh/Hudgens test"). Unlike the Twin Rivers Homeowners' Association, the
company-owned town in Marsh exercised the "full spectrum" of municipal powers, including law
enforcement, leading to the arrest of the Jehovah's Witness by the town's deputy sheriff. Marsh,
326 U.S. at 503-04. Cf Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568-69 (1972) (finding "no
comparable assumption or exercise of municipal functions or power," as in Marsh).
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function.154 And concededly, community associations resemble municipalities
by enacting regulations affecting community governance and providing certain
services. 15 Some commentators, however, overemphasize the importance of
community associations providing municipal services as a basis for equating
the associations with state actors. 156 Services such as street paving and
garbage collection do not implicate
First Amendment rights, and are therefore
157
less significant considerations.
Despite similarities between community associations and municipal
governments, community associations also display private characteristics that
distinguish them from traditional towns. 158 First, community associations are
formed by private developers, and their powers stem from recorded covenants
that run with the land. 159 Moreover, members are willing to purchase
individual lots or units burdened by these covenants. 16 The covenants
obligate owners to pay assessments to maintain common property and support
the association's activities. 161 In essence, by virtue of private contractual
agreements, buyer-members agree to abide by association regulations. 162 By
63
contrast, municipality residents do not enter into similar binding agreements.
Because community associations display both private and public
characteristics, simply categorizing such organizations as state actors ignores
their private character. Although community associations may step into the

154. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (noting that the city's administration of the
park amounted to state action).
155. See Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 2, at 635. Community associations offer members
services, including road maintenance and trash removal. Id. The power that community
associations exercise to assess levies is comparable to a municipality's taxing power. Id. Further,
both community associations and municipalities conduct periodic elections and elect
representatives. Id.
156. See, e.g., Franzese & Siegel, supra note 153, at 730-31 (stating that the "trends [in
maintenance services and fee collections] lead inexorably to the conclusion that" commoninterest communities are more pervasive, but "[t]he laissez-fare [sic] approach to ... regulation
... affords exceedingly few rights" (first emphasis added)).
157. See infra Part III.A. This is a major strength of the revised functional approach
discussed below because it considers both the type of activity and whether that activity implicates
constitutional rights.
158. See Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 2, at 636-37 (noting that in many ways
municipalities are not a "smooth fit" as an analogy to community associations).
159. See id. at 637.
160. See Hyatt, supra note 9, at 6-7.
161. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.2 (2000); Hyatt & Stubblefield,
supra note 2, at 599-600.
162. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.2 (2000).
163. See Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 2, at 637. Municipal corporations are forged by a
process mandated by state law in which residents vote or petition for municipal status. Id In
addition, a municipal corporation represents a political subdivision of a state, and may exercise
lawmaking authority delegated to the state. See id.
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shoes of the state when performing particular functions, 164 recognizing
community associations as state actors for all purposes
would subject those
1 65
organizations to wide-ranging constitutional liability.'
C. The State Entwinement Theory and Common-Interest Communities
Other commentators suggest that community associations may be deemed
state actors because of the state's involvement in regulating or creating
community associations.1 66 Under the holding in Brentwood Academy, federal
constitutional provisions may apply to a private organization if the
organization and the state act interdependently.
All fifty states have enacted
statutes regulating the creation of condominiums, and several others have
1 68
statutes addressing other methods of common-interest ownership.
164. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 562 (1972). In curtailing the holding of
Logan Valley, the Court emphasized functionality as a determinative factor in evaluating state
action:
I think it is fair to say that the basis on which the Marsh decision rested was that the
property involved encompassed an area that for all practical purposes had been turned
into a town; the area had all the attributes of a town and was exactly like any other town
in Alabama.
Id. at 563 (quoting Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308,
330-31 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting)).
165. See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1149 (The Foundation
Press 1978) ("The state action requirement, it is generally thought, furthers two primary purposes.
First, by exempting private action from the reach of the Constitution's prohibitions, it stops the
Constitution short of preempting individual liberty--of denying to individuals the freedom to
make certain choices, such as choices of the persons with whom they will associate. Such
freedom is basic under any conception of liberty, but it would be lost if individuals had to
conform their conduct to the Constitution's demands.").
166. See Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 2, at 659 (noting a significant increase in state
involvement in the creation of common-interest communities).
167. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001).
168. See Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 2, at 659. A growing minority of states, including
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia, have enacted statutes
regulating the creation of common-interest communities. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.08.090300 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1801 (2007); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1350-76 (West 2007);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-33.3-102 (2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.302 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008);
MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § llB-106 (LexisNexis 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515B.1-102
(West 2002 & Supp. 2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.1201 (Lexis Nexis 2007); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 47F-1-102 (West 2005 & Supp. 2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 94.560(5) (2005); PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5201 (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27A, § 1-101 (2006); VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-508 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.38.005 (West 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
36B-1-102 (LexisNexis 2005); see also Steven Siegel, The Public Role in EstablishingPrivate
Residential Communities: Towards a New Formulation of Local Government and Land Use
Policies that Eliminates the Legal Requirements to Privitize New Communities in the United
States, 38 URB. LAW. 859, 888-89 (2006) ("[The] rise of the territorial community association as
the standard template for new community development in the fastest growing areas of the United
States is a partial consequence of local government land use policy and, in particular, of
privatization decisions made by local government in the land use review process.").
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According to Brentwood Academy, a finding of entwinement requires
69
significant interdependence between a private organization and the state.'
Furthermore, at least one court has found that pervasive entwinement between
the association and the state does not exist merely because community
associations are subject to state law. 170 Therefore, the entwinement theory is
not a workable method in the context of common-interest communities.
D. The JudicialEnforcement Theory and Common-Interest Communities
Some commentators point to the "judicial enforcement" theory announced in
Shelley v. Kraemer as a mechanism for dissident residents seeking to invalidate
community association regulations. 17 1 In Shelley, the Court determined that
judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant prohibiting the sale of
property to non-whites amounted to state action. 172 Because both the buyer
and the seller were willing, enforcement of73the discriminatory covenant could
be attained only through state court action.'
The majority of courts have rejected Shelley as a basis for 1'74
applying federal
or state constitutional provisions to homeowners' associations.
As one court
noted, finding state action through judicial enforcement is predicated on action
by the judiciary.' 75 Thus, a theory based on judicial enforcement essentially
precludes community members from initiating lawsuits claiming constitutional
deprivation without prior judicial action.

169. BrentwoodAcad, 531 U.S. at 291.
170. See Brock v. Watergate Mobile Home Park Ass'n, 502 So. 2d 1380, 1382 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) ("The state cannot be implicated in the association's activities solely because the
association is subject to State law."). But see Franzese & Siegel, supra note 153, at 754 (asserting
municipalities have become increasingly entwined in the formation of common-interest
communities: "mounting evidence suggests that the establishment of a homeowners [sic]
association is often a requirement of local government land use policy").
171. See Suarez, supra note 6, at 756-57.
172. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1948).
173. See id. at 19; see also Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 2, at 658. Because some courts
have limited Shelley to cases involving racial discrimination, while others apply Shelley to all
discriminatory covenants, it is unclear to what extent Shelley applies to community association
covenants. Id.
174. See supranote 138 and accompanying text.
175. Goldberg v. 400 E. Ohio Condo. Ass'n, 12 F. Supp. 2d 820, 822 (N.D. 11. 1998). A
condominium or homeowners' association must obtain a judgment or order enforcing a particular
regulation before community members may allege a constitutional violation. Id.

2008]

Callingfor a Revised FunctionalApproach

1179

III. A REVISED FUNCTIONAL APPROACH RECOGNIZES THE DUAL PRIVATEPUBLIC CHARACTER OF COMMON-INTEREST COMMUNITIES

A. Scope andPurpose

Existing modes of dealing with the state action problem provide mixed
results in the community association context. 176 A revised functional approach
amends the public-function theory, 177 and considers foremost the nature of the
challenged activity. 178 The analysis inquires as to whether the challenged
activity is essentially private or essentially governmental. 79 Restrictions on
certain types of political speech and policing by private security forces are
examples of governmental activity implicating constitutionally protected
rights.1 80 This inquiry focuses on the extent that the community association
has superseded the state in performing particular functions. 181 The revised
approach contrasts with the public-function theory by characterizing an
association performing a particular governmental82 function as a state actor for
the limited purpose of carrying out that activity.
B. A Revised FunctionalApproach and United States Supreme Court
Precedent

A revised functional theory draws legitimacy from United States Supreme
Court precedent. In both Marsh and Evans, the nature of the activity
performed by private entities weighed heavily in the Court's analysis.183
According to the Supreme Court in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, Marsh turned on

the type of activity performed by the company-owned town: "[i]n effect, the
owner of the company town was performing the full spectrum of municipal
powers and stood in the shoes of the State."' Chickasaw represented a state
actor because it employed the "full spectrum" of municipal powers, including
8
law enforcement, which led to the arrest of the Jehovah's Witness in Marsh.'
By contrast, community associations perform only a limited "spectrum" of

176.
177.

See supra Part II.A-D.
See supra Part II.B.

178. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1946); see also Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
179. See supra Part I.D.I.
180. See infra Part III.C.
181. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 507-09; see also Evans, 382 U.S. at 299.
182. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-57 (1988); see also Rosborough v. Mgmt. &
Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2003).
183. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 507-09; see also Evans, 382 U.S. at 299; supra Part lI.B.
184. See Lloyd v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972).
185. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503-04.
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municipal powers.186 It follows that community associations should be sub*ect
to constitutional standards only when performing governmental functions.
C. A Revised FunctionalApproach Applied to Twin Rivers
and Galaxy Towers

A revised functional analysis of Twin Rivers yields the same conclusion
reached by the New Jersey Supreme Court.

The conflict between the

Committee for a Better Twin Rivers and the Association arose over internal
association governance. 88 Committee members sought to post campaign
signs, hold informational meetings in the community room, and place
advertisements in the community newsletter opposing the current board. 189
Imposing conditions on access to common facilities and regulating content in a
community newsletter appear to be private functions rather than governmental
functions because both the community room and newsletter represent internal
resources designated solely for residents' use.' And although regulating sign
postings to one sign per lawn may appear analogous to municipal zoning
ordinances curbing political speech, the Twin Rivers court characterized
those
91

regulations as reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.
By contrast, the challenged political activity in Galaxy Towers was external
92
rather
internal.
In state
that case,
the by
Association
primarily
politicalthan
activities
affecting
elections
endorsing engaged
particularincandidates,

186. See Bluvias v. Winfield Mut. Hous. Corp., 556 A.2d 321, 322 (N.J. 1989) (reasoning
that the Association failed the public-function test because the municipality continued to provide
essential services including public education).
187. See West, 487 U.S. at 56-57; see also Rosborough, 350 F.3d at 461. Both the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts have recognized privately managed prisons as susceptible to
constitutional liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See West, 487 U.S. at 57; see also Rosborough,
350 F.3d at 461. Implicit in the analysis applicable to privately operated prisons is the notion that
private management corporations are deemed public or state actors for the limited purpose of
maintaining inmates. See Rosborough, 350 F.3d at 461. Otherwise, those private organizations
maintain their private character. See West, 487 U.S. at 54-57. Similarly, a physician who
contracts with the state to provide medical services to inmates represents a state actor for the
limited purposes of caring for the incarcerated. See id. That physician maintains his private
status when he treats other patients outside the prison facility. See id. A community association
may be deemed a public or state actor when it engages in particularly governmental activity, but it
also maintains its private status and avoids constitutional liability when engaged in other
activities.
188. See Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 929 A.2d
1060, 1064-65 (N.J. 2007).
189. Id
190. Id. at 1073.
191. Id. at 1074.
192. Guttenberg Taxpayers and Rentpayers Ass'n v. Galaxy Towers Condo. Ass'n, 688 A.2d
156-57 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) (addressing whether the Association could prohibit nonassociation-endorsed school board candidates from distributing campaign materials in the Galaxy
complex).
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distributing campaign materials, and organizing get-out-the-vote drives.1 93 A
revised functional approach would characterize such electioneering activities
as governmental in nature because the Association's campaigning had a
demonstrable effect on local politics.1 94 Because the Association's voter
mobilization activities affected campaigns for public office, this favors
recognizing it as a state actor for the limited purpose of performing
electioneering activities. 195 Rather than focusing on public access and
invitation, this approach offers a practical
solution by subjecting the
1 96
association to limited constitutional liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
A scheme for considering community association conduct based on public
access and invitation appears incongruent. Developing a new framework to
characterize community associations as state actors for narrow purposes both
safeguards residents and maintains the integrity of private organizations. A
revised functional approach ensures that community members enjoy federal
constitutional protections when their associations encroach on governmental
roles. At the same time, residential associations assume constitutional liability
under limited circumstances. A welcome byproduct is that courts may be more
willing to recognize community associations as state actors when associations
engage in traditionally governmental activities. A revised model strikes a
fundamental balance by preserving the rights of association members and
maintaining the force of the state action doctrine.
193.

Id.at 158-59.
194. Id. The court noted the size and composition of voting districts in Guttenberg, asserting
that nearly twenty-four percent of registered voters in Guttenberg reside in Galaxy Towers. Id. at
158. The court emphasized that "Galaxy voters account for a significant proportion of the total
votes cast in any given Guttenberg election." Id. The court also asserted that campaigning in
District 6, which included Galaxy, had a historically significant effect on election outcomes:
"[e]lection results in the recent past reveal that Association-backed candidates have consistently
lost in Districts I through 5 by substantial majorities, but have nevertheless won their respective
contests by carrying overwhelming majorities in District 6." Id
195. See Brian Jason Fleming, Regulation of Political Signs in Private Homeowner
Associations: A New Approach, 59 VAND. L. REv. 571, 597 (2006) (arguing that courts should
recognize an exception when evaluating private covenants curtailing "discourse relating to
electoral politics").
196. See TRIBE, supra note 165, § 18-2, at 1149 (noting the significance of exempting private
conduct from the reach of the Constitution's prohibitions). Restrictions on political speech are
often the subject of community association litigation and offer fertile territory for the application
of the revised functional approach. Another illustrative example is in private policing. If private
security officers were charged not only with enforcing association regulations but also with
keeping the peace generally, such officers, arguably, would be constrained by the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments because they would be executing the police powers of the state. The
community association would be considered a state actor for the purposes of policing. Cf Galaxy
Towers, 688 A.2d at 158 (noting that the association's regulations had a significant effect on local
politics).
Likewise, private policing would significantly affect local policy and therefore,
arguably result in the same outcome.
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